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The New Era of Presidential Immigration Law 
Michael Kagan* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At the dawn of the Obama Administration, Professors Adam Cox 
and Cristina Rodriguez wrote: "[T]he inauguration of a new President 
can bring with it remarkable changes in immigration policy."1 At the 
time they wrote that, this proposition was in some ways more a matter 
of advocacy than a description of reality. Despite its perennial role at 
the top of the nation's domestic policy agenda, immigration policy was 
marked by political stalemate in Congress coupled with considerable 
institutional inertia in the executive branch. 2 Professors Cox and 
Rodriguez, along with Professor Hiroshi Motomura, Professor Shoba 
Sivaprasad Wadhia and many others, played an important role in 
pushing President Obama to use prosecutorial discretion openly and 
aggressively to change how immigration law was enforced, especially 
once it became clear that Congress would not pass comprehensive 
immigration reform during his time in office. Although this was not 
President Obama's preferred course of action, his use of executive 
action has dramatically changed the ways and means of immigration 
policy.3 
As we approach the election of a new president in 2016, we finally 
live in the world that Professors Cox and Rodriguez advocated. The 
election of a new President will likely carry significant immediate 
consequences for immigration policy, regardless of whether Congress 
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1. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 
458, 464 (2009). 
2. For an insightful account of this political inertia, see Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, The 
Political Economies of Immigration Law, 2 UC IRVINE L. REV. 1 (2012). 
3. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Immigration, 
WHITEHOUSE.Gov (June 15, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2012/06/15/remarks-president-immigration [https://perma.cc/HD8E-YJRD] ("I have said time 
and time and time again to Congress that, send me the DREAM Act, put it on my desk, and I will 
sign it right away."); President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation 
on Immigration, WHITEHOUSE.Gov (Nov. 20. 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/ll/20/remarks-president-address-nation-immigration [https://perma.cc/EC4T-KPHT] ("I 
worked with Congress on a comprehensive fix, and last year, 68 Democrats, Republicans, and 
indepenaents came together to pass a bipartisan bill in the Senate."). 
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reforms the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"). My goal in this 
short space will be to focus on how this new role of the presidency in 
setting immigration policy will change the practice of immigration law. I 
hope to do three things. First, I will attempt to articulate the historically 
significant change that I believe has occurred. Second, I will outline 
how, in this new era, it is possible for immigration lawyers to assist many 
people who until recently were entirely out of luck. Third, I will 
highlight the reality that presidential immigration policy is inherently 
unstable, which has important implications for the practice of 
immigration law. 
II. WHAT Is DIFFERENT Now 
It is something of a paradox that there is still some dispute whether 
the steps President Obama has taken truly represent anything different 
from steps that Presidents have taken in the past.4 Since backers of 
President Obama's actions have defended them as being consistent with 
immigration measures used by previous administrations, it is more 
difficult to be clear about the degree to which President Obama has also 
done something new, and to give him due credit. In arguing that 
President Obama has made a historically significant change in how 
immigration policy is made, it is important to note that history has been 
invoked in at least two different ways in reference to immigration 
discretion. One role of history has been as a foundation for advocacy. 
But the other is more descriptive. 
The advocacy use· of history can be seen in the contributions of 
legal scholars to the development of the Obama Administration's 
policies. The central point has been that the Obama Administration did 
not invent prosecutorial discretion in immigration law. As Professor 
Wadhia has extensively discussed, discretion generally and deferred 
action specifically have been part of American immigration policy for 
decades. 5 These precedents provided the essential justification for 
President Obama's actions. The main point of the May 28, 2012 letter 
from law professors, organized by Professor Motomura (and which, in 
the interest of full and proud disclosure, I also signed), was that "there is 
clear executive authority for several forms of administrative relief" for 
sympathetic noncitizens who were theoretically deportable under the 
statute.6 
4. One can see this in the discussion between Professor Wadhia and Professor Motomura in 
this Issue. 
5. See generally SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES (2015); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The 
History of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1285 (2015). 
6. Letter from Hiroshi Motomura, Susan Westerberg Prager Professor of Law, UCLA School 
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For advocacy purposes, establishing this legal authority and 
historical record was important. Although executive action on 
immigration was not really new, previous Presidents had generally given 
these policies a lower profile, and had often resisted revealing them to 
the public.7 This may have served a useful political purpose. If the 
public did not understand that the President has wide discretion to 
change immigration enforcement policy, then a President could easily 
deflect blame for the harsh human consequences that ensue when our 
largely unworkable, and often illogical, immigration laws are enforced. 
However, once it became clear (at least amongst President Obama's 
supporters) that the President has discretion about how the law should 
be enforced, pressure built for the President to use it-of course 
President Obama has. 
The results are significant. The Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals ("DACA") and the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans 
and Lawful Permanent Residents ("DAP A") programs have the 
potential to reach millions. New enforcement policies announced by the 
Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") in November 2014 
indicated that unlawfully present noncitizens without significant 
criminal records will not be priorities for deportation.8 Taken together, 
a recent study reported that the Administration's prosecutorial 
discretion policies may benefit as many as eighty-seven percent of the 
unauthorized immigrants in the United States. 9 
There continues to be debate about precisely how far the 
President's authority to change immigration policy goes under the 
separation of powers doctrine. 10 Litigation has delayed expansion of the 
of Law, et al., to President Barack Obama, (May 28, 2012), 
https://www.law.uh.edu/ihelg/documents/ExecutiveAuthorityForDREAMReliet28May2012withSign 
atures.pdf [https://perma.cc/3C6D-F6NY]. 
7. See Michael Kagan, A Taxonomy of Discretion: Refining the Legality Debate About 
Obama 's Executive Actions on Immigration, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1083, 1094-96 (2015). 
8. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y of Homeland Sec., on Policies for the 
Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants (Nov. 20, 2014), 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/l 4_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion. pdf 
[http://perma.ccNL V3-PVED]. 
9. Julia Preston, Most Undocumented Immigrants Will Stay Under Obama 's New Policies, 
Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/us/politics/most-
undocumented-immigrants-will-stay-under-obamas-new-policies-report-says.html?_r=l 
[http://perma.cc/R9RA-HEFC]. 
10. See Hiroshi Motomura, The President's Dilemma: Executive Authority, Enforcement, and 
the Rule of Law in Immigration Law, 55 WASHBURN L. J. 1 (2015) [hereinafter Motomura, The 
President's Dilemma]; Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law 
Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104 (2015). Compare Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The 
Obama Administrations Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take 
Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781 (2013) (arguing that Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
("DACA") violates the Take Care clause), with Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of DAPA Part 
I: Congressional Acquiescence to Deferred Action, 103 GEO. L. J. ONLINE 96 (2015) (arguing that 
DACA and Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents ("DAPA") 
are unconstitutional). 
i 
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DACA program and of the implementation of the DAPA program, 
which the President announced in November 2014.11 This litigation has 
focused in part on whether the Administrative Procedure Act ("AP A") 
requires a notice-and-comment process to change deferred action 
policies.12 However, the technical details of President Obama's policies, 
and the question of whether some of them should have gone through a 
formal rulemaking process, may matter less in the long run than the 
simple fact that it is now widely understood that the President can do a 
great deal to change immigration policy without Congressional action. 
The Supreme Court may need to resolve how far the President may go 
to establish categorically-defined discretionary programs.13 Large scale 
deferred action programs like DACA are a major part of the historic 
shift that has taken place, but so is setting transparent enforcement 
priorities, such as President Obama's policy that the DHS should deport 
"felons, not families." 14 
When he ran for president in 2008, President Obama said he 
wanted to bring immigrants "out of the shadows." President Obama has 
also taken a significant step to bring immigration policy out of the 
shadows. Previously key prosecutorial discretion policies would have 
been revealed only through the Freedom of Information Act. 15 This 
fact that immigration enforcement policies are now easily accessible, 
and the fact that they are written with categorical specificity, means that 
it should now be more possible for immigrants and their lawyers to 
anticipate how the laws will be enforced. This opens up new 
opportunities for lawyers to advise and represent clients, as I will 
explain below. 
The other use of history is to describe, in a more scholarly vein, 
how immigration policy has evolved to this point, and to suggest where 
it may be going. Professor Motomura's Article in this Issue offers a 
cogent view about how recent changes under the Obama 
Administration bring order to a previously ad hoc situation. To borrow 
11. See Texas v. United States, No. 15-40238 (5th Cir. 2015) (affirming the preliminary 
injunction). Michael D. Shear & Julie Preston, In Courts, Running Out the Clock on Obama 
Immigration Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/14/us/in-courts-
running-out-the-clock-on-obama-immigration-plan.html?_r=O [perma.cc/364L-XGKD); Michael 
Kagan, Binding the Enforcers: The Administrative Law Struggle Behind President Obama 's 
Immigration Actions, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Kagan, Binding the Enforcers]. 
12. Id 
13. See Texas, 2015 WL 6873190, at *2 (adding a "substantive APA" ground in addition to the 
procedural AP A ground). 
14. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on 
Immigration, supra note 3. 
15. Cf. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, My Great FOIA Adventure and Discoveries of Deferred 
Action Cases at ICE, 27 GEO. lMMIGR. L. J. 345 (2013) (describing the author's efforts to obtain 
deferred action policies from previous administrations, which had not been initially disclosed to the 
public). 
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phrases that Professor Motomura has aptly used, immigration outside 
the law has long been a feature of immigration in the United States.16 
As a direct consequence, we have long had de facto immigration policy 
through which federal authorities decide whom among this larger group 
to deport and whom to allow to remain outside the letter of the law.17 
President Obama has provided both the public and the frontline 
enforcement officers clear guidelines about how this previously shadowy 
area of immigration policy should operate. 
With this historical context, I would propose that there are three 
ways in which President Obama has significantly changed the dynamics 
of immigration policy. 
First, his actions are substantial in scale. Rather than targeting a 
single discrete group, his actions impact nearly every unauthorized 
immigrant in the country. In essence, the Obama policies divide 
unlawfully present immigrants into three categories. They designate a 
minority as a priority for deportation. They inform a second group 
(probably the largest) that they are not likely to be targeted for 
enforcement, so long as they avoid arrest for criminal activity. Finally, 
the new policies allow a third group to apply for deferred action 
(DACA and possibly DAPA), and to receive employment 
authorization. 
Second, his policies are highly transparent with clear, easily 
understandable criteria for discretion published and formal application 
procedures established for potential beneficiaries. In the past an 
unlawfully present immigrant would have little choice but to live in fear 
of arrest and deportation, even if the actual risk remained low for most. 
Now, an unlawfully present immigrant can find out which category they 
fall into by consulting an easily located government website, and 
possibly filing an application form.1s 
Third, President Obama has deliberately sought substantial 
publicity and political attention for his policies by announcing them in 
major speeches and promoting them through the use of the bully pulpit. 
He has thus injected discretionary immigration policy into national 
politics at the highest level, rather than leave it in the technocratic world 
of administrative agency operations. 
16. See generally HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW (2014). 
17. See Motomura, The Presidents Dilemma, supra note 10, at 19 (describing "a large gap 
emerged between immigration law on the books and immigration law in action."). 
18. Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND 
lMMIGR. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-
arrivals-daca#request%20DACA [http://perma.cc/A4CC-8VQ8]. 
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III. NO LONGER OUT OF LUCK 
Someone once told me that the most important immigration status 
to understand in the United States is "SOL."19 Until recently, this 
statement was as true as it was blunt. For the eleven million 
unauthorized immigrants in the country, our immigration laws simply 
offer no remedy. This is of course the nut of the immigration reform 
debate. It is also a paramount feature of immigration law practice. 
Many practicing immigration lawyers have been asked to help someone 
fix their immigration situation, often by someone who believes that if 
they just find the right lawyer, there will be a solution. But most 
l!nlawfully present immigrants are unlawfully present because they are 
ineligible for a visa according to the INA. This situation is a great boon 
for morally corrupt attorneys and notarios, who can easily sell false 
hope to the desperate.20 But for the honest lawyer, there is often no 
good advice to give. Immigration is a rare area of law that actually 
penalizes people for bringing themselves into compliance. Even if 
unlawfully present noncitizens leave the country-which is presumably 
what Congress wants them to do-the unlawful presence bars will 
attach, making it harder for them to ever come back. 21 
President Obama has not solved this problem-only legislative 
immigration reform can do that. However, he has significantly 
improved the situation so that many people are no longer completely 
out of luck. The greatest gains come to those who are able to receive 
deferred action, since they receive employment authorization. A 2015 
survey reported that ninety-six percent of DACA recipients were 
employed or in school, and that they are buying automobiles at higher 
rates than pre-DACA. Nearly seventy percent reported moving to a job 
with better pay, with average wages for DACA recipients increasing 
from $11.92 to $17.29 per hour.22 But the greatest number of 
beneficiaries are those immigrants who may not qualify for deferred 
action, yet do not have a serious criminal record, and thus do not fall 
under the enforcement priorities announced by the DHS.23 They will 
19. See SOL, URB. DICTIONARY (May 1, 2002), 
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=SOL [http://perma.cc/RS85-TIBB]. 
20. See, e.g., Fight Notario Fraud, AM. B. Ass'N, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_services/immigration/projects_initiatives/fightnotariofrau 
d.html [http://perma.cc/524B-GD8B]. 
21. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (2012) (establishing three and ten year unlawful presence grounds 
of inadmissibility, which are triggered when a previously unlawfully present person leaves the United 
States). 
22. Tom K. Wong, Kelly K. Richter, Ignacia Rodriguez & Philip E. Wolgin, Results from a 
Nationwide Survey of DACA Recipients Illustrate the Program's Impact, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 
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not receive a written notice that the government is exercising 
prosecutorial discretion, nor an employment authorization document. 
But they may be able to rest more easily, knowing that they stand a very 
good chance of simply being left alone. 24 
The clarity and transparency of the Obama policies has important 
implications for the practice of immigration law because it allows 
lawyers to give concrete advice about how discretion would be exercised 
in these cases. Before 2012, immigration lawyers could give concrete 
advice only about those immigration benefits that are based in the 
statute or regulations-eligibility for family or employment visas, the 
possibility of winning asylum or cancellation of removal, and so on. 
Resourceful lawyers could try to obtain deferred action, parole, or other 
discretionary relief for their clients, but it would have been difficult to 
advise a client definitively about her chances, or even to provide 
assurance that she would not be put into removal proceedings if 
unsuccessful.25 Because DACA has such clear criteria, as well as a clear 
application procedure, lawyers can now provide more definitive advice 
to people whose only hope is to benefit from the exercise of discretion. 
Beyond telling clients if they are currently eligible for deferred 
action, lawyers now also have the ability to advise clients prospectively 
regarding the ways they can improve their standing under current DHS 
policies. In this light, the DHS enforcement priorities raise some 
interesting questions for legal practitioners. The criteria used to define 
the priorities are nearly as clear as the eligibility guidelines for DACA. 
But unlike deferred action, the DHS will not normally send the person a 
written statement assuring them that they are not going to be subject to 
deportation. This policy replaced the Morton Memos, which seemed, 
when they were issued, to offer the hope of more discretion, but proved 
to change little in practice regarding the DHS's pursuit of noncitizens 
for deportation. 26 In part, this is because the Morton Memos were 
inherently ambiguous. Even though the Obama policy is considerably 
more clear cut, for many lawyers, it may take considerable time to gain 
confidence that the enforcement priorities policy will be reliably 
24. See infra discussion at 11-12. 
25. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Sharing Secrets: Examining Deferred Action and 
Transparency in Immigration Law, 10 U.N.H. L. REV. 1, 7 (2012). 
26. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Customs & Immigration Enforcement, on 
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of 
the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, & Removal of Aliens, (June 17, 2011), 
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/5T8Z-RER9]; Memorandum From John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs 
Enforcement, on Prosecutorial Discretion: Certain Victims, Witnesses, & Plaintiffs, (June 17, 2011), 
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/5T8Z-RER9]. For discussion of the limitations and failures of the Morton Memos, 
see Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 10, at 69, and Kagan, Binding the Enforcers, supra note 11. 
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adhered to. 
The clarity of the new policy would allow a lawyer to advise a client 
about where he stands vis-a-vis DHS's enforcement priorities, and to 
try, if at all possible, to not be a priority for DHS. The most important 
arena where this new tool may be used is probably in criminal defense. 
This is because the most operative criteria distinguishing priority cases 
from others are criminal convictions. For legal immigrants, it is a Sixth 
Amendment right to be advised about the risk of deportation that might 
ensue from a proposed plea bargain. 27 The Supreme Court has said that 
in borderline cases it wants defense attorneys and prosecutors to "plea 
bargain creatively" in order to craft a plea that may satisfy the penal 
interests of the state while avoiding an aggravated felony or other 
offense considered removable in immigration law.28 The DHS 
enforcement priority policies invite defense attorneys representing 
unlawfully present immigrants to make a similar effort to craft pleas that 
will prevent their clients from becoming priorities for DHS removal. 
I am regularly involved in plea negotiations exactly like this. In my 
role as co-director of the Immigration Clinic at the University of 
Nevada, Las Vegas, I consult with the Clark County Public Defender on 
cases involving noncitizen defendants. From this experience, let me 
offer a provocative scenario to illustrate how attorneys might use the 
DHS enforcement priorities to help their clients. Imagine an unlawfully 
present noncitizen who is charged with grand larceny, a Nevada felony, 
and who is desperate to stay in the United States if at all possible. 
Assume that the prosecution case is strong, and negotiating a favorable 
plea is the most prudent strategy for the defense. The district attorney 
might offer to let the defendant plea to attempted grand larceny, also a 
felony, but offer to suspend a one year prison sentence. However, this 
plea is unattractive for a noncitizen because it would likely constitute an 
aggravated felony, subjecting the defendant to mandatory detention by 
the DHS, which would be followed by near certain deportation. 
For a legal permanent resident in this situation, there are a number 
of creative pleas that the defense might try to reach as an alternative. 
The easiest would be to offer to plead to an offense under Nevada law 
that is not an aggravated felony under the federal immigration statute. 29 
A more favorable option for the defense would be to persuade the 
prosecutor to accept a plea to a gross misdemeanor instead of a felony. 
This may require a harder bargain with the prosecutor, such as offering 
27. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010). 
28. Id. 
29. For example: Nevada burglary is not an aggravated felony. See NRS § 205.060 (2013) 
(Nevada burglary definition); Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (similar California 
burglary statute is categorically not an aggravated felony). 
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to pay a higher fine, more restitution, or even offering to serve actual 
prison time instead of a suspended sentence. But it is typically harder 
for an unauthorized immigrant to develop such a plea bargaining 
strategy. Note that, before November 2014, an unlawfully present 
defendant would be on very uncertain ground, even if a prosecutor were 
willing to entertain a creative approach to the plea negotiation. 
Previously, even if the defendant avoids the felony, the DHS might 
nevertheless have pursued deportation. This uncertainty reduced the 
benefits of plea bargaining for a well-advised defendant. 
In this situation, the clarity of the new DHS enforcement priorities 
could be a game changer. The defendant now knows that he can avoid 
being a priority for deportation by avoiding a felony conviction, 
avoiding any conviction with a prison sentence of ninety days or more, 
and avoiding incurring three or more misdemeanor convictions. The 
defendant thus has a very strong incentive to avoid a felony, and has 
some guidance about what he could offer the district attorney in 
exchange. The noncitizen could offer to accept two gross misdemeanor 
convictions, instance, rather than just one count. Or, more boldly, he 
could offer to actually serve up to eighty-nine days in prison when the 
prosecutor originally offered a suspended sentence. 
Let me be clear: as a practicing attorney, I would be cautious about 
pursuing such a deal, though I would not rule it out so long as the 
defendant is well-advised about the risks. This scenario envisions a 
defendant offering to pay a significant price in terms of hard time in 
prison to avoid deportation, based on trust that the DHS will adhere to 
policies that ultimately are unenforceable. For now at least, a defendant 
would need to understand that this strategy is fraught with risk because 
no attorney can guarantee that the DHS will strictly follow its 
enforcement priorities. A nonpriority individual can still be deported-
and someone who comes so close to the line may very well tempt the 
DHS to exercise its discretion to seek deportation regardless of the 
technicalities of the policy. All things being equal, would a defendant 
not want to try to be on the nonpriority side of that line if at all 
possible? What if five years from now there is empirical data showing 
that the DHS really is following the priorities strictly? To the degree 
that the DHS policies can be taken at face value, it is now possible for 
resourceful lawyers to use them to improve the situation of immigrants 
who only a few years ago would have been beyond help. 
IV. ELECTIONS AND CONSEQUENCES 
If the inauguration of a new President can herald major changes in 
immigration law, as Professors Cox and Rodriguez wrote, immigration 
126 Washbum Law Joumal [Vol. 55 
policy is destined to be highly unstable. This instability has been evident 
since DACA was introduced in 2012 by President Obama in a Rose 
Garden ceremony, during his re-election campaign. Because DACA is 
based on executive discretion, the durability of the program became 
immediately bound up in the question of who would win the election. 
In the summer of 2012, there were reports that some eligible people 
were hesitating to apply for DACA until after the election.30 Governor 
Mitt Romney said that if elected he would not issue new DACA grants, 
but he would honor those already issued. 31 This left unclear what would 
happen when the initial two-year DACA grants began expiring in 2014. 
Media reports indicated that the rate of new DACA applications slowed 
in the weeks immediately before the election. 32 A newspaper catering 
to the Filipino community in the United States headlined a 2012 post-
election article succinctly: "DACA Program secure as Obama wins re-
election."33 Of course, it would have been more accurate to say, "secure 
for more four years." 
Discretionary immigration policy is now a major issue in 
presidential campaigns, meaning that the fate of millions of immigrants 
may be tied more directly than in the past to the outcome of the 
election. This reality was made abundantly clear on May 6, 2015, when 
former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton went to Las Vegas to make a 
major policy statement about immigration, less than a month after 
announcing her presidential campaign. 34 She first called for 
comprehensive immigration reform and a path to citizenship for 
unauthorized immigrants, a position identical to Barack Obama's in 
2008. She then went on to address executive action, an issue that was 
largely absent from the 2008 campaign. She pledged that if Congress 
failed to act, as president she would keep the Obama executive actions, 
and "go even further," specifically by expanding deferred action to 
include parents of childhood arrivals. 35 
On the Republican side (to give just two examples), in April 2015 
30. New America Media, Deferred Deportation Program: Fear Causes Youth to Wait, 
MsHALE (Aug. 30, 2012), http://mshale.com/2012/08/30/deferred-deportation-program-fear-youth-
wait/ [http://perma.cd47EN-6Z6D]. 
31. David Grant, Critics Pounce After Mitt Romney Says He'd Honor Obama Approvals for 
Illegals, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Oct. 2, 2012) 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Elections/President/2012/1002/Critics-pounce-after-Mitt-Romney-
says-he-d-honor-Obama-approvals-for-illegals [http://perma.cc/YLU6-T4MZ]. 




34. Eric Bradner & Dan Merica, Clinton calls for 'path to full and equal citizenship', CNN (May 
6, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/05/politics/hillary-clinton-immigration-electoin-2016/ 
[http://perma.cdJJ8J-WGKK]. 
35. Id 
2015] The New Era of Presidential Immigration Law 127 
Governor Jeb Bush said that he would overturn DACA and DAPA.36 
In April 2015, Senator Marco Rubio said he would bring DACA to an 
end gradually. 37 It is a remarkable change that presidential candidates 
are staking out these positions on deferred action so early and 
prominently in the campaign cycle, given that not long ago deferred 
action was an obscure and largely shadowy aspect of American 
immigration law. In 2016, voters have clear choices to make, and their 
choices could lead to rapid shifts in immigration law enforcement. 
This instability is a new feature of immigration law, because 
immigration law otherwise has been, if nothing else, quite durable. The 
basic .structure of the INA dates to the 1960s, and some provisions go 
back to the nineteenth century.38 The last major immigration reforms 
were enacted in the Clinton Administration, though Congress has 
periodically tinkered with details or added new visa categories. 39 This 
stability is the result of inertia, political stalemate, and of the difficulty 
of enacting legislation on a complex and fraught subject-even during 
periods when the House, Senate, and White House are controlled by the 
same political party. But it would be much easier for the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to simply issue a new memo changing enforcement 
priorities. 
Instability may simply be the natural consequence of enhanced 
political accountability. There is currently an open question whether 
the kinds of immigration policies that the Obama Administration have 
enacted should go through a formal rule making process under the 
AP A. 40 This is the central contention that justified the initial 
preliminary injunction against DAPA and the expansion of DACA.41 If 
formal rule making is required, then the process would slow somewhat. 
I have argued elsewhere that this application of the AP A would be an 
error.42 In part, I argue that it is a good thing for a new President to be 
36. Sahil Kapur, Jeb Bush Vows To Overturn Obama's Actions On Immigration, TALKING 
POINTS MEMO (April 22, 2015), http:/ltalkingpointsmemo.com/dc/jeb-bush-overturn-obama-
immigration [http://perma.ccN6XT-9K8L]. 
37. Sarah Rumpf, Rubio Affirms He'll End Obama's Executive Amnesty, Univision Interview 
Mistranslated, BREITBART (April 18, 2015), http:/lwww.breitbart.com/big-
government/2015/04/18/rubio-affirms-hell-end-obamas-executive-amnesty-univision-interview-
mistranslated/ [http:/lperma.cc/CY3W-M6ZX]. 
38. See generally Motomura, The Presidents Dilemma, supra note 10, at,15. 
39. The last major immigration reform law was the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 104 Cong. 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). However, there have been 
more recent changes to immigration law that focused on more narrow problems. For example, in 
2000 Congress established new visa categories for crime victims and trafficking victims, known as the 
U Visa and T Visa, respectively. Pub. L. No.106-386, 114 Stat. 1518 § 1502(a) (2000) (included in the 
Victirrls of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 
(2000)). 
40. See Kagan, Binding the Enforcers, supra note 11. 
41. Id; Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015). 
42. Kagan, Binding the Enforcers, supra note 11. See also Michael Kagan, The Uses and 
Abuses of Notice and Comment, IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (Nov. 22, 2015) 
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able to rapidly change how immigration law is enforced, so long as the 
change is made transparently, because this enhances political 
accountability. In my view, it is good for democracy for law 
enforcement policies to be accountable to the electorate. 43 
However, the more that a new President has the ability to easily 
shift enforcement priorities, the more immigration policy will become 
unstable. Thus, while clearer discretionary policies allow lawyers to 
offer more useful advice to clients, it also requires them to be more 
sensitive to the potential for political change, and to advise clients 
accordingly. This is a normal role for lawyers to play. Our profession's 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct state, "In rendering advice, a 
lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as 
moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the 
client's situation."44 Lawyers advising corporations would routinely 
need to advise their clients about how the election of a Democrat or 
Republican to the White House might change the enforcement of 
environmental or antitrust law. Immigration lawyers increasingly will 
need to act the same way. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Immigration enforcement policy, and the discretionary choices that 
such enforcement entails are now a prominent part of presidential 
politics. This is new. As recently as the George W. Bush 
Administration, and even in President Obama's first term, the 
President's primary public role vis-a-vis immigration policy was to 
promote legislative change through Congress. That role remains, but it 
is now complimented by a parallel power to choose how and against 
whom to enforce the laws on the books. Just as important, the public 
knows that the President has this power, and expects to know how he or 
she will exercise it. My goal in this Essay has been to briefly highlight 
some ways in which this new reality will change the practice of 
immigration law. But even if I am off the mark about some potential 
impacts, my central contention is that we are living in a new era. It is 
not the substantial immigration law reform that President Obama or 
many immigration scholars wanted. But it is a substantial and mostly 
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